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Abstract
When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some con-
sumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning
the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist’s pricing and “waiting” strategies
when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We show when the monopolist offers
introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. We also find two types of separating equi-
libria: one where high type signals its quality by choosing a different price than the low
type in the first period, and another where the high-type monopolist announces the
product in the first period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates
a credible cost for signalling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signalling device.
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1 Introduction
Microsoft finished Windows 7 before July, 2009; however, the launch date was set as October
22, 2009.1 In the meantime, consumers heard about the quality of Windows 7 -e.g., com-
parison with Vista- through magazines such as Business Week. In this paper, we give one
possible explanation of why a monopolist announces a later launch date rather than selling
its product right away. We show that such a waiting strategy signals high quality.
In this paper, we not only analyze seller’s waiting incentives but also consumers’ waiting
incentives. Specifically, when a new product is introduced to the market, only a few con-
sumers buy it right away. The others wait and then decide whether or not to buy. We show
that there are two reasons for this waiting. First, consumers wait to learn more about the
unknown quality of the good (strategic delay effect, an effect neglected in the literature).
Second, they wait to take advantage of the lower price, if the price will decrease (price effect,
a well-known reason in the literature). We analyze firms’ pricing strategies with these two
effects and relate it to the practice of low introductory prices, and the strategy of waiting
before selling.
In our model, a continuum of consumers decide whether to buy one unit of a durable
good in one of the two periods. A consumer’s total willingness to pay for the good depends
on the consumer’s taste for quality (private value) and the good’s unknown intrinsic quality
(common value). Consumers’ taste for quality is uniformly distributed. The quality of the
product is revealed in the second period. This uncertainty resolution makes the consumers
with moderate preferences delay their buying strategically. By delaying her purchase, the
consumer avoids buying a low quality good. However, she gives up the utility she could have
derived from a high quality good in the first period. The monopolist who knows its product’s
quality and decides how to price it and when to start selling it when there are both strategic
delay and price effects.
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to solve our two period signalling model. We find
two types of separating and one type of pooling equilibria depending on the parameters.
In all pooling equilibria, we find the same sufficient condition for the monopolist to offer
1Business Week, October 26, 2009, page 71.
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introductory low prices or to use a cream-skimming strategy.
The monopoly pricing literature is a huge one, and can be divided into durable goods
(e.g. Coase (1972), Gul et. al. (1986), Stokey (1979)) and experience goods literature. The
experience goods literature focuses on introductory pricing (e.g., Shapiro (1983), Cremer
(1984), Bagwell (1987), Schlee (2001), Bergemann and Valimaki (2006)) or price discrimina-
tion to new and repeat customers (Jing (2011)).2 In the aforementioned “experience goods”
papers, consumers learn their private valuation by “experiencing” the good; hence, they nei-
ther discuss signalling quality nor consumers’ strategic delay. (unlike this “durable goods”
paper).3 In other experience goods papers (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1986)), signalling via
pricing is discussed but consumers’ strategic delay incentive does not exist.
We have two kinds of separating equilibria. In the first one, the high type monopolist
announces the product launch date in the first period and sells its product only in the second
period although the product is ready from the start. Our paper’s innovation is to show that
waiting before selling serves as a signalling strategy, and that consumers have the option of
delaying their buying. There are “vaporware” papers that show why some firms announce
launch dates before the product is 푟푒푎푑푦 (e.g., Bayus et al. (2001), Dranove and Gandal
(2003), Kristiansen (2006), Choi et al. (2010)).4 Unlike these papers, our firm’s product is
ready in the first period but the firm chooses not to sell at that time in order to signal its
quality.5 Waiting creates a credible cost for signalling; hence, the high-type monopolist uses
this as a signalling device.
In the other type of separating equilibrium, low and high types each chooses different
prices in the first period. Both low and high type use high and declining prices in such an
equilibrium; in order to sell to the residual “low willingness to pay consumers” in the second
period, they have no choice but to lower the price. Our model is different than Bagwell and
2These papers generally discuss cream-skimming like our paper.
3Van Ackere and Reyniers (1995) is a quasi-durable good paper that explains introductory offers (and
trade-ins). Their model also does not have strategic delay.
4Vaporware means falsely announcing product launch dates.
5Some firms present their products in expos for the public; hence, experts and consumers can verify that
the product is ready. For example, Sony showed its PlayStation 4 console (PS4) in E3-2013 Expo but Sony
made the announcement that it will release PS4 in Holiday 2013 season (which is November) according to
various websites including www.pcadvisor.co.uk
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Riordan (1991) (quality is learned in the second period, there are no expert consumers etc.)
so the different result, in the sense that low type also uses high and declining price, is not
surprising.
The theme of this paper is also related to the literature on the durable good monopolist
in which buyers’ incentive to delay purchases causes the monopolist to reduce prices immedi-
ately (Coase (1972), Gul et. al. (1986)) and the intertemporal price discrimination literature
in which prices fall as time passes (Stokey (1979), Landsberger and Meilijson (1985), Tirole
(1989)). Our paper extends these papers to allow for uncertainty on the common value
component (quality) of consumers’ total willingness to pay. We show that price increase is
possible in the short term, although “the higher willingness to pay” consumers, in terms of
pure private value, bought their unit demand in the first period and exited the market. In
the second period, the residual “lower willingness to pay” consumers learn that the good’s
quality is much higher than their expectation. Then, the high-type monopolist can charge a
higher second period price in a pooling equilibrium.
Our paper also falls into the strategic delay literature (e.g., Aoyagi (1998), Heidhues and
Melissas (2006), Gunay (2008a), Gunay (2008b)). To our best knowledge, there is no paper
in this literature that shows how a monopolist will price its good when facing consumers who
delay their buying strategically. Bose et. al. (2008) discuss how a monopolist price its goods
when faced by one consumer at each period or Bhalla (2011) discusses how a monopolist
will price its good when faced with non-strategic consumers; however, their consumers do
not have strategic delay incentives.6
In what follows, we set up our model. We define our Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in
the Appendix. We use this equilibrium concept to show what type of equilibria exist. We
discuss various assumptions and generalizations at the end. All proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
6Lopomo and Squintani (2007) also discuss whether the seller will choose to sell in the spot market or
forward market. They assume all consumers have the same type, and the seller has a different discount
factor unlike us. As a result, we find different separating equilibria.
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2 The Model
A monopolist’s product is exogenously set to be either high quality 훾ℎ = 1 or low quality
훾푙 ∈ [0, 1). The monopolist has private information about his type, 훾푖 ∈ Ψ = {1, 훾푙}. In
the first period, he determines the price, 푝푖1 ∈ [0,∞) (where 푖 = 퐻,퐿 depending on quality)
or announces the launch date as the second period. That is, his action set in the first
period is 퐴1푀 = [0,∞)
∪{announce}. A continuum of consumers are indexed by their taste
parameters 휃 which is uniformly distributed on Θ = [0, 1]. Each consumer has a unit demand
and believes that 훾푖 = 1 with probability 훼 > 0 and 훾푖 = 훾푙, with probability 1-훼.
7 After
observing the monopolist’s action 푎1푀 , each consumer updates her belief. We denote this
first period posterior by 휇1퐵(훾푖 = 1∣푎1푀). Given their beliefs, each consumer chooses an
action 푎1퐵 ∈ 퐴1퐵 ={Buy, Delay}.8 The monopolist does not know the type of consumers
but knows their taste distribution; therefore, the monopolist cannot price discriminate in
any given period.
Monopolist observes
quality and
sets the price 푝푖1
or announces launch date.
FIRST PERIOD
Consumers
update priors.
Decide whether
to buy.
SECOND PERIOD
Consumers observe quality and 푝푖2.
Then decide whether to buy.
Monopolist sets the price 푝푖2
Figure 1: TIMING OF THE GAME
At the beginning of the second period, the true quality of the product is revealed to
the “informed” consumers, and in this section we assume all consumers are informed.9 Let
ℎ = [푎1퐵(휃, 푎1푀), 푎1푀 ∈ 퐴1푀 , 훾푖] ∈ 퐻 denote the history that summarizes the actions taken
by each player in the first period, the quality revealed in the second period and 퐻 denote the
history space. In period 2, the monopolist chooses its second period price 푝2 ∈ 퐴2푀 = [0,∞)
7This is a durable good since consumers have a unit demand.
8If “announce” is chosen by the monopolist, then all consumers delay in the first period.
9The justification of this assumption is as follows. Consumer Report style magazines may reveal the
product once it is on the market or if some consumers bought the product, they may reveal the true quality
to the other consumers by using internet or other forms of media; they have no incentive to misrepresent
the true quality since re-selling is not modelled in this paper. We also relax this assumption later by
assuming only a fraction 훽 of consumers learn the true quality in the second period. Informed
consumers, their type denoted by 휏 = 퐼, learn the quality, and uninformed consumers 휏 = 푈
do not learn the quality (unless it is a separating equilibrium).
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and then each consumer chooses an action 푎2퐵 ∈ 퐴2퐵 ={Buy, Do not Buy}. Consumers
beliefs in this period are 휇2퐵 : 퐻×퐴2푀×{퐼, 푈} 7→ [0, 1]. Since we assume that all consumers
are informed (휏 = 퐼) in this section, we have 휇2퐵 = 1 if 훾푖 = 1; otherwise 휇2퐵 = 0.
A (pure) behavioral strategy 휎푀 of the monopolist consists of two mappings: First,
휎1푀 : Ψ = {훾푙, 1} 7→ 퐴1푀 . Second, 휎2푀 : 퐻 ×Ψ 7→ 퐴2푀 .
A (pure) behavioral strategy 휎퐵 of the buyers/consumers consists of two mappings: First,
휎1퐵 : Θ = [0, 1]× 퐴1푀 7→ 퐴1퐵.10 Second, 휎2퐵 : 퐻 × 퐴2푀 ×Θ 7→ 퐴2퐵.
Both the consumers and the monopolist have the same discount factor 훿 ∈ (0, 1]. A type
휃 who buys the good in the first period derives an expected utility of (1 + 훿)[(휇1퐵 + (1 −
휇1퐵)훾푙)휃−푝푖1] after observing the price 푝푖1. Instead, if she delays buying to the second period,
then, looking from the first period, she derives an expected utility of 훿[휇1퐵(휃1 − 푝퐻2 ) + (1−
휇1퐵)(휃1훾푙 − 푝퐿2 )]. If she does not buy it at all, she derives a zero utility.
Both type of monopolist’s marginal and fixed cost of production are equal to zero.
The monopolist maximizes its payoff 푢푀(휎퐵, 휎푀) = 푝1
∫
푉
푑푘 + 훿푝2
∫
푌
푑푘. The sets 푉 =
[휃∣휎1퐵(휃, 푝1) = 퐵푢푦] and 푌 = [휃∣휎2퐵(휃, ℎ, 푝2) = 퐵푢푦] are the sets of first and second period
buyers, respectively. The corresponding integrals give the mass of each set. Since consumers
have unit demand, we have 푉
∩
푌 = ∅.
2.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Our model is a two-period signalling game in which the uncertainty about the monopolist’s
type will be revealed in the second period. We define our Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in
the Appendix (Definition 1). We first define the sequential rationality conditions for the
monopolist and the consumers (Condition 1 and 2). That is, when they reach the second
period (given the relevant history), they should act rationally. Condition 3 and 4 show how
the monopolist and each consumer choose their strategies in the first period. Condition 5
is the usual Bayesian updating condition for the consumers. We only look for pure strategy
equilibria in which consumers use threshold strategies. Specifically, for any 푎1푀 , 푝2, ℎ, there
exists 휃1(푝1) and 휃2(ℎ, 푝2) such that:
10Note that buyers observe prices before making a decision. Their history is essentially (ℎ푡, 푝푡+1), 푡 = 0, 1,
where ℎ0 denotes the null history.
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휎1퐵(휃, 푎1푀) =
{
퐵푢푦 if 휃 ∈ (휃1, 1]
퐷푒푙푎푦 if 휃 ∈ [0, 휃1) 표푟 푎1푀 = {푎푛푛표푢푛푐푒}
휎2퐵(휃, ℎ, 푝2) =
{
퐵푢푦 if 휃 ∈ [휃2, 휃1]
퐷표 푁표푡 퐵푢푦, if 휃 ∈ [0, 휃2)
In what follows, we will analyze the equilibrium strategies. Given condition 1 and 2 of
our equilibrium, we should start solving the problem backwards. The quality and 휃1 will be
revealed in the second period, then consumers will buy if their payoff is non-negative; that
is, the second period buyers are 푌 = {휃 ≥ 휃2∣휃2훾푖 − 푝푖2 = 0 푎푛푑 푎1퐵(휃) = 퐷푒푙푎푦}. The 휃2
consumer is the threshold agent that is just indifferent between buying and not buying in the
second period. The monopolist’s maximization problem in this period gives the following
prices and the second period profits, Π2(훾푖):
max
푝푖2
푝푖2(휃1 − 휃2) 푠.푡. 휃2훾푖 − 푝푖2 = 0 ⇒ 푝푖2 =
훾푖휃1
2
⇒ Π2(훾푖) = 훾푖(휃1
2
)2 (1)
Now moving back to the customers’ equilibrium strategies in period 1, each consumer
will form a belief 휇1퐵 that the good is high quality after observing the first period price, 푝1.
The threshold agent 휃1 will receive the following payoff from buying:
(1 + 훿)휃1[휇1퐵 + (1− 휇1퐵)훾푙]− 푝푖1
If she delays buying the good, she will receive a (discounted expected) payoff of
훿[휇1퐵(휃1 − 푝퐻2 ) + (1− 휇1퐵)(휃1훾푙 − 푝퐿2 )]
where 푝푗2 is the second period price when the revealed quality is 푗 = 퐻,퐿. By equating
these two terms, we can calculate the set of first period buyers 푉 = [휃1, 1] and the set of
second period buyers 푌 = [휃2, 휃1). Specifically, by plugging in for the second period price
and solving for the indifference condition gives us:
휃1(푝
푖
1, 휇1퐵) =
2푝푖1
(2 + 훿)[휇1퐵 + (1− 휇1퐵)훾푙] (2)
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Now, we can write the monopolist’s profit (payoff) as a function of 푝푖1 and 휇1퐵 with the
help of equation 1:
푉훾푖(푝
푖
1, 휇1퐵) = 푝
푖
1(1− 휃1(푝푖1, 휇1퐵)) + 훿훾푖(
휃1(푝
푖
1, 휇1퐵)
2
)2 (3)
2.2 Separating Equilibrium: Both Types Sell in Both Periods
In what follows, we will give different types of separating equilibria. In the separating
equilibrium given in Proposition 1, consumers will be convinced of high quality if they see
a very high price in the first period. The low type monopolist chooses its profit maximizing
price rather than imitating the high-type. The high type will be better off by choosing the
equilibrium price rather than waiting/announcing and selling only in the second period, or
posing as low type in the first period. In this equilibrium, prices will decline for both types
in the second period. Therefore, the result is different than Bagwell and Riordan (1991) in
the sense that low type also chooses high and declining prices.
Figure 2: A separation equilibrium example when high type separates itself by choosing
푝1 ∈ {1.253, 1.295}. The lines are equilibrium and deviation payoffs for high and low types.
While it is not shown on the graph, waiting to sell in the second period is not profitable
when 0.34 < 푝1 < 1.3.
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Proposition 1 Assume that 훾푙 >
훿
훿+4
. There are separating equilibria in which both low and
high type monopolist sell in both periods. There is an equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive
Criterion.
The high type sets a (very) high price in the first period and sells only to a small subset of
consumers, despite the fact that consumers correctly infer that this is a high quality product.
The low type cannot mimic this strategy of setting a high price in the first period since selling
only a small subset of consumers in the first period (and, as a result, having a low total sales
in both periods) is not profitable. Instead, it wants to sell as much as possible both in the
first and the second period. This can be done by setting a low enough price in the first
period. As 훾푙 gets smaller, the low type’s profit decreases in a separating equilibrium. If
it gets too small, then the low type would deviate by choosing the high type monopolists’s
price since this gives him a higher profit. This is why we need the condition 훾푙 >
훿
훿+4
.
Figure 3 shows an example of such an equilibrium. It shows the price range in which the
high-type and the low-type will not deviate. When the price is in the overlapping area, no
types will deviate and hence we have a separating equilibrium. The high type should also
not deviate to “waiting and only selling in the second period” equilibrium (this range is not
shown in the figure).
2.3 Pooling Equilibrium and Introductory Low Price
In Proposition 2 below, we explain pooling equilibria.
Proposition 2 There are pooling equilibria in which both types choose the same price to sell
in the first period. When 훾푙 = 0, there is an equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
Let us concentrate on the equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion. Since 훾푙 = 0,
if the low type deviates, it cannot sell any product and end up with zero profits. Therefore,
the low type does not deviate. The high type has no incentive to deviate to be seen as low
type but may have an incentive to deviate to waiting. When consumers believe that a firm
is a high type with probability 훼 if 푝1 in the range
훿(2+훿)훼
4(2+훿)훼−2훿 < 푝1 <
(2+훿)훼
2
, then deviation
to waiting is not profitable, and a pooling equilibrium can be sustained.
9
Given equation 2, we know that 푑휃1
푑훼
< 0. In other words, when consumers are more
pessimistic, more of them strategically delay their buying to the second period. By equation
1, we know that 푑푝2
푑훼
= 훾푖
2
푑휃1
푑훼
< 0. That is, the more strategically delay their buying to
the second period, the higher the second period price of the monopolist. Not surprisingly,
the high type increases its price more, and this inevitably deters strategic delay incentives.
However, we admit that this may be due to modelling assumptions since as 휃1 increases (due
to a lower 훼), the remaining consumers have a higher willingness to pay (compared to a
lower 휃1). Hence, both type of monopolist can and do charge a higher price.
Our main interest is to analyze when the firm uses the introductory low price strategy and
when they use the cream skimming strategy (that is, lower the prices in the second period).
The next proposition finds sufficient conditions for these strategies for a given equilibrium.
We note that this sufficient condition is exactly the same for all equilibria of Proposition 2.
The reason is that the consumers’ (off and on path) beliefs determine the first period price
but the monopolist’s profit maximization problem determines the second period price.
Proposition 3 For any given pooling equilibrium: a) (introductory low price) the high-type
firm will set a higher second period price if 훿 < 1−2(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)
(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙) . b) (cream-skimming) The
high-type firm will set a lower second period price if 훿 > 1−2(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)
(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙) .
As 푝2 is higher in equilibrium, the cost of delaying strategically will be higher for con-
sumers. In addition, if the consumers are too pessimistic about the quality, firms are more
likely to offer introductory low prices. The high-type monopolist sells to “the high willing-
ness to pay” consumers in the first period. In a pure private value durable good model,
the monopolist has no chance but to lower the price in the second period to sell to the
remaining/residual lower types. In our model, the remaining lower willingness to pay con-
sumers, in the second period, learn that the quality is much higher than their expectations.
Hence, their total willingness to pay increases. This will enable the monopolist to charge a
higher price. This result differs from the intertemporal price discrimination literature (such
as Stokey (1979), Landsberger and Meilijison (1985), Tirole (1989)) which shows that the
price must decrease in all periods. Once the uncertainty is resolved (and if we had more
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than two periods), we are essentially back in the pure private value model and the price will
decrease starting from period three onwards. Introducing uncertainty on quality is the key
factor that differentiates our results from the rest of the literature.11
In Shapiro (1983), myopic consumers have point estimates of the quality (biased expecta-
tions). If their estimate is lower than actual quality, the firm offers a low introductory price
so that consumers can pay higher prices in repeat purchases. Since consumers are myopic,
they do not have the price expectation or strategic delay incentives that the consumers in
our model have.
Corollary 4 Let 훾푙 = 0. a) If 훼 <
1
3
, the high type will set a higher second period price. b)
If 훼 > 1
2
then the high type will set a lower second period price.
In the proofs, we show that only when 훾푙 = 0, then the pooling equilibrium satisfies the
intuitive criterion. In this case, using proposition 3, the condition for offering introductory
low price becomes 훿 < 1−2훼
훼
. If 훼 ≤ 1
3
, this condition is always satisfied; hence, the high type
monopolist will always offer introductory low price. Since consumers are pessimistic about
the quality, the high type monopolist has to offer a very low price in the first period (and
even then relatively a small percentage of consumers buy the product in the first period).
When the quality is revealed, consumers are willing to pay a higher price for the high quality
good.
In the following example, for 훾푙 > 0, we give a parameter range in which the pooling
equilibrium exists while neither separating nor waiting equilibria exists.
Example 5 Let 휇1퐵 = 훿 = 0.4 and 훾푙 = 0. Since 훾푙 = 0, there cannot be any separating
equilibrium (in which there is positive sale in the first period). Low type will always mimic
the high type to guarantee a positive profit rather than receiving zero separating equilibrium
profit. In our pooling equilibrium, consumers will believe that any firm choosing 푝1 = 0.4
11There are two other papers that discuss Coasian dynamics with agents consuming two goods unlike our
paper. Koh (2006) shows that a durable good monopolist who commits to its pricing path and faces infinitely
lived heterogeneous agents consuming both perishable and durable good may offer low prices initially. His
results depend on the consumption of perishable good in each period. Lee (2003) shows that Coasian
dynamics may lead to the sale of degraded goods that are as costly as producing high-quality goods. Selling
de-graded goods mitigate consumers’ waiting incentives.
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is a high type with probability 0.4. In the proof of pooling equilibrium, we show that for
any 푝1 ∈ {0.12, 0.48} (with belief 휇1퐵 = 0.4) and 훾푙 < 훿2+훿 , waiting equilibrium payoff is
lower than the pooling equilibrium payoff for the high type and hence we have a pooling
equilibrium.12 In such an equilibrium, the second period price will be 푝2 ≃ 0.468 which is
greater than the first period price.
2.4 Separating Equilibrium: High-Type Waits
In proposition 6 below, we give a waiting equilibrium. If the low type monopolist’s quality
is too low (and consumers believe that any firm waiting is a high type), the high-type finds
it profitable to wait for the second period (i.e., announce) rather than selling as a low type
in the first period. The low type chooses its profit maximizing price in the first period.
Proposition 6 (Waiting equilibrium) Suppose that 훾푙 <
훿
2+훿
holds. There are separating
equilibria in which low type sells in the first period and the high type announces the product
launch date in the first period and waits to sell in the second period. If 훾푙 = 0, the equilibrium
satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
If 훾푙 = 0, then the low type would like to mimic the high type’s price in the first period
price. The high type responds by waiting to sell in the first period, and hence, a “waiting
equilibrium” is sustained.
A monopolist may signal its quality through announcing the launch date of its product
although its product is ready at the time. Hence, this is not a “vaporware” example (unlike
Dranove and Gandal (2003)) since the product is delivered on its launch date. In order to
have such a waiting equilibrium, 훾푙 should be low enough so that the high type will have a
great incentive to distinguish itself from the low type (depending on the off-path equilibrium
beliefs, it would not choose to sell in the first period). Also, as discount factor increases, it
is more likely to have such an equilibrium since waiting is less costly.
When 훾푙 is zero, the intuitive criterion is satisfied since any deviation by the high type
will be followed by the low type who receives the zero payoff in the waiting equilibrium. In
12We impose the off-path equilibrium belief that for any other 푝1, consumers believe that this is a low
type with probability 1.
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other words, there is no 푝1 choice by the high type that is equilibrium dominated for the low
type.
3 When only 훽 fraction of agents learn the true quality
in the second period
In this section, we will show that we can construct the “waiting equilibrium” when only a 훽
fraction of agents learn the true quality in the second period.
We assume that the monopolist cannot distinguish the informed and uninformed con-
sumers in the second period so price discrimination is not possible.
The second period profit maximization function of the 훾푖 > 0 type monopolist is as
follows:
max
푝푖2
푝푖2[훽(휃1 −
푝푖2
훾푖
) + (1− 훽)(휃1 − 푝
푖
2
휇2퐵 + (1− 휇2퐵)훾푙 )] (4)
since informed agents buy the product as long as their type satisfies 휃훾푖 − 푝푖2 ≥ 0 and
uninformed agents buy as long as their type satisfies 휃(휇2퐵 + (1 − 휇2퐵)훾푙) − 푝푖2 ≥ 0. The
uninformed agents use the expected value of 훾푖 given their second period beliefs 휇2퐵.
If we differentiate this function with respect to 푝2 and set it to zero, we can get the profit
maximizing second period price 푝푖2 as a function of 휃1 which is
푝푖2 =
휃1훾푖(휇2퐵 + 훾푙 − 훾푙휇2퐵)
2[(훽(휇2퐵 + 훾푙 − 훾푙휇2퐵 − 훾푖) + 훾푖)] (5)
Then, given 휃1, the profit maximization of the monopolist is:
max
푝1
푝1(1−휃1)+훿푝푖2[훽(휃1−
푝푖2
훾푖
)+(1−훽)(휃1− 푝2
휇2퐵 + (1− 휇2퐵)훾푙 )] 푠.푡 푒푞 2 푎푛푑 푒푞 5 (6)
To construct a waiting equilibrium, let us suppose that consumers believe any firm who
do not wait/announce is a low type; that is, 휇1퐵(푎1푀 = 푝1) = 0. First, let us find the range
in which the low type monopolist will not imitate the high type who is waiting. The low type
monopolist’s profit in the waiting equilibrium can be found from the equation 6 when 휇2퐵 = 0
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since consumers can detect the type in a separating equilibrium.13 We need to calculate 휃1.
Given the beliefs, we can calculate it from the equation (1 + 훿)휃1훾푙 − 푝1 = 훿[휃1훾푙 − 푝2]. By
using equation 5, we derive that 휃1 =
2푝1
(2+훿)훾푙
. Note that 훽 has no role since consumers know
the type with certainty in a separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the profit of low
type will be the same as in equation 6:
퐿표푤 푇푦푝푒 푃푟표푓푖푡 푖푛 푊푎푖푡푖푛푔 퐸푞 =
훾푙(2 + 훿)
2
4(4 + 훿)
If the low type deviates to waiting, then we can calculate the deviation profit by setting
휇2퐵(., 휏 = 푈) = 1 but 휇2퐵(., 휏 = 퐼) = 0. In this equilibrium, since low type does not sell
anything in the first period, we have 휃1 = 1. By using equation 6, we get the deviation profit
which is:
퐿표푤 푇푦푝푒 퐷푒푣푖푎푡푖표푛 푃푟표푓푖푡 =
훿훾푙
4[(1− 훾푙)훽 + 훾푙]
If the equilibrium profit is higher than the deviation profit, we know that low type would
not deviate to waiting. This condition is
훾푙(2 + 훿)
2
4(4 + 훿)
≥ 훿훾푙
4[(1− 훾푙)훽 + 훾푙] ⇔ 훾푙 ≥
(4 + 훿)훿 − 훽(2 + 훿)2
(1− 훽)(2 + 훿)2
If 훾푙 is big enough, then the low type does not have to deviate to waiting. Also, as 훽
approaches to 1, the numerator becomes negative and the condition is always satisfied. The
more informed the consumers are, the more likely to have a waiting equilibrium in which
high type waits but the low type sells in the first period. This is an intuitive result.
Now, we will derive the condition that the high type does not deviate.
It is easy to see that the profit of the high type in a waiting equilibrium is the same as
in the main model which is 훿
4
.
If the high type deviates to selling in the first period, then the beliefs will be 휇1퐵 = 0,
휇2퐵(., 휏 = 퐼) = 1, and 휇2퐵(., 휏 = 푈) = 0. Then, the threshold agent 휃1 can be found from
13Specifically, 휇2퐵(., 휏 = 퐼) = 휇2퐵(., 휏 = 푈) = 0. That is, both informed and uninformed consumers know
that this is a low type since this is a separating equilibrium.
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the equation (1+ 훿)휃1훾푙− 푝1 = 훿(휃1훾푙− 푝2). By using this, and equation 6, we can calculate
the deviation profit of the hight type:14
(2 + 훿)2훾푙(1− 훽(1− 훾푙))
4[4− (4훽 + 2훿훽)(1− 훾푙) + 훿]
Hence, the high type does not deviate if 훿
4
− (2+훿)2훾푙(1−훽(1−훾푙))
4[4−(4훽+2훿훽)(1−훾푙)+훿] > 0 holds for some
parameter range of (훽, 훾푙, 훿). Intuitively, we expect that as 훽 → 1, there are waiting equilibria.
To show one equilibrium, we set 훾푙 = 0.25. Then, by using MAPLE, we showed that when
훽 = 훿 = 0.9, there is a waiting equilibrium since both the low type and the high type would
not deviate. Of course, by continuity, one can see that there are infinitely many waiting
equilibrium when we chose parameters close to the set ones.
4 Efficiency Loss and Welfare in Waiting Equilibrium
Case
In this section, we will calculate the efficiency loss for the equilibrium that satisfies the
intuitive criterion (i.e., 훾푙 = 0) for the waiting equilibrium. In the Appendix, we analyze the
welfare loss for separating equilibrium case.
We will calculate the efficiency loss of waiting equilibrium when 훾푙 = 0 compared to
the perfect information case. The low type does not produce anything neither in the per-
fect information case nor in the waiting equilibrium so there is no efficiency loss when the
monopolist is low type of 훾푙 = 0.
The high type will only sell in the second period and from equation 1, one can easily see
that 푝2 = 휃2 =
1
2
. Therefore, welfare under the waiting equilibrium, 푊푤, given that 훼 is the
probability of having the high type, is:
푊푤 = 훼훿(
1
4
+
1
8
) = 훼훿
3
8
The first term in the parenthesis is the profit and the second term is the consumer surplus
which can be calculated from 훿
∫ 1
1
2
(휃 − 1
2
)푑휃.
14If 훽 = 1, we get the same profit as in the previous section which is
(2+훿)2훾2푙
4[4훾푙+2훿훾푙−훿]
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The welfare under the perfect information case, 푊푝 is as follows. In this case, 휇1퐵 = 1
since there is perfect information. A quick calculation shows that second period maximization
problem gives 푝2 = 휃2 =
휃1
2
. Since 휃1 =
2푝1
2+훿
(from equation 2 when 휇1퐵 = 1), the profit
maximization problem becomes:
max
푝1
푝1(1− 2푝1
2 + 훿
) +
훿
4
(
2푝1
(2 + 훿)
)2
When we differentiate, we find the first order conditions:
1− 4푝1
2 + 훿
+
훿2푝1
(2 + 훿)2
= 0
This gives 푝1 =
(2+훿)2
2(4+훿)
and 휃1 =
2+훿
4+훿
. We can calculate the profit of high type (From
equation 3):
푉훾ℎ(푝1 =
(2 + 훿)2
2(4 + 훿)
, 휇1퐵 = 1) =
(2 + 훿)2
4(4 + 훿)
The consumer surplus is:
∫ 1
휃1=
2+훿
(4+훿)
(휃 − (2 + 훿)
2
2(4 + 훿)
)푑휃 + 훿
∫ 휃2= 2+훿(4+훿)
휃1=
2+훿
2(4+훿)
(휃 − 2 + 훿
2(4 + 훿)
)푑휃
= [
1
2
− (2 + 훿)
2
2(4 + 훿)2
− (2 + 훿)
2
2(4 + 훿)
+
(2 + 훿)3
2(4 + 훿)2
] + 훿[
(2 + 훿)2
8(4 + 훿)2
]
where the first bracket parenthesis is the first period consumer surplus, the second one
is the second period consumer surplus (after simplifications). We summarize the efficiency
loss and its derivative with respect to 훿 in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 The efficiency loss in waiting equilibrium is:
퐸퐿푤 = 푊푝 −푊푤 = 훼
2(4 + 훿)2
[(3 + 훿)(4− 3훿)]
Efficiency loss decreases as agents become more patient:
푑(푊푝 −푊푤)
푑훿
=
훼(−44− 19훿)
2(4 + 훿)3
< 0
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As 훿 increases, efficiency loss decreases. Increase in 훿 has two (counter) effects on 푊푝.
The first effect causes price to increase. This makes fewer agents buy the good. Consumer
surplus decreases; hence, this lowers welfare. However, the second effect causes profits to
increase. The second effect dominates and 푊푝 increases. It is easy to see that 푊푤 increases
with 훿. It must be the case that 푊푤 increases more than 푊푝; therefore, the efficiency loss
decreases.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
If we extend the model to three or more periods, we will find that the price will decrease
from the third period onwards. Since the uncertain common value will be learned in the
second period, this model will essentially be a pure private value durable good model. If
the monopolist wants to sell to the residual lower willingness to pay type consumers in the
third period, it has to decrease the price (as in Stokey (1979) or Landsberger and Meilijson
(1985)).
The model produces many pooling equilibria; however, we show that the sufficient con-
dition to offer introductory low prices or use cream-skimming strategies is the same for any
given pooling equilibrium. In our pooling equilibria, the beliefs determine the first period
price but the monopolist’s actual profit maximization motive determines the second period
price. As long as the beliefs of consumers are known, the equilibrium that will be selected is
known by all parties; that is, there is no coordination problem. However, we do not attempt
to explain how these beliefs are formed.
We have used uniform distribution. We believe that using a general distribution would
not bring any new insights than the current paper but only complicate the model.
5.1 Conclusion
We show how a monopolist will price its good when consumers do not know the quality
but will learn it in the second period. This leads to strategic delay and price expectations
on the part of consumers. The monopolist will take these into account and price its good
dynamically.
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One of our main contributions is showing that the high type monopolist can signal its
quality by announcing a future launch date even though the product is ready to sell today.
Microsoft’s launching of Windows 7 may be an example to this strategy.15
Signalling creates a welfare loss. We show that as agents become more patient or the low
type’s quality increases, this loss decreases.
One contribution of our paper is to show that consumers may delay their buying to learn
quality. This is in contrast with Coasian dynamics under a model in which there is no
learning.
6 Appendix
Definition 1 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium): A profile of (pure) strategies 휎 =
(휎1퐵, 휎2퐵, 휎1푀 , 휎2푀) (where 휎1푀 : Ψ 7→ 퐴1푀 and 휎2푀 : 퐻×Ψ 7→ 퐴2푀 and 휎1퐵 : Θ×퐴1푀 7→
퐴1퐵, and 휎2퐵 : 퐻 × 퐴2푀 × Θ 7→ 퐴2퐵.) and the belief system 휇 = (휇1퐵, 휇2퐵) (where
휇1퐵 : 퐴1푀 7→ [0, 1], and 휇2퐵 : 퐻 × 퐴2푀 × {퐼, 푈} 7→ [0, 1] is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
if
Condition 1. For any 훾푖 and ℎ, 휎2푀(훾푖, ℎ) solves
max푝2 푝2[
∫
휎2퐵(휃,ℎ,푝2,휏=퐼)=퐵푢푦
푑휃 +
∫
휎2퐵(휃,ℎ,푝2,휏=푈)=퐵푢푦
푑휃]
Condition 2. For any 휃, 휏 , ℎ, and 푝2, 휎2퐵(휃, 휏, ℎ, 푝2) = 퐵푢푦 iff 휃[휇2퐵(ℎ, 푝2, 휏) + (1 −
휇2퐵(ℎ, 푝2, 휏)훾푙] ≥ 푝2.
Condition 3. For any 훾푖, 휎1푀(훾푖) solves
max
푎1푀
{훿휎2푀(훾푖, ℎ(푎1퐵, 푎1푀 = 푎푛푛표푢푛푐푒, 훾푖))
∫
휎2퐵(휃,휏,ℎ(.,푎1푀=푎푛푛표푢푛푐푒),휎2푀 (훾푖,ℎ(.,푎1푀=푎푛푛표푢푛푐푒)))=퐵푢푦
∫
푑휏푑휃,
max
푝1
푝1
∫
휎1퐵(휃,푝1)=퐵푢푦
푑휃 + 훿휎2푀(훾푖, ℎ(푎1퐵, 푝1, 훾푖))
∫
휎2퐵(휃,휏,ℎ(.,푝1),휎2푀 (훾푖,ℎ(.,푝1)))=퐵푢푦
∫
푑휏푑휃}
where ℎ(푎1퐵, 푎1푀 , 훾푖) is the history that arises when the monopolist offers price 푝1 or
chooses announce, the buyers choose their actions according to 푎1퐵 in period 1 and the
quality 훾푖 is revealed but only learned by the informed buyers (휏 = 퐼)
15We emphasize that our paper is a theoretical exercise and there may be other reasons for this waiting.
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Condition 4. For any 휃 and 푝1, 휎1퐵(휃, 푝1) = 퐵푢푦 if and only if:
(1 + 훿)휃(휇1퐵(푝1) + (1− 휇1퐵(푝1)훾푙)− 푝1 ≥
훿[휇1퐵(푝1)(휃 − 휎2푀(훾ℎ, ℎ′)) + (1− 휇1퐵(푝1))(휃훾푙 − 휎2푀(훾푙, ℎ′))]
where ℎ′ = ℎ({휎1퐵(휃′, 푝1)}휃′ ∕=휃, 푎1퐵(휃) = 퐷푒푙푎푦, 푝1, 훾푖) is the history that arises when in
period 1, the type 휃 consumer delays his decision while the monopolist offers price 푝1 and
other consumers choose their actions according to 휎1퐵, and the revealed quality is 훾푖.
For any 휃, 휎1퐵(휃, 푎푛푛표푢푛푐푒) = 퐷푒푙푎푦.
Condition 5. Consumers update their beliefs using Bayesian rule whenever possible. In
the second period, since the quality is revealed to informed consumers, we have 휇2퐵(ℎ
′, 휎2푀 , 휏 =
퐼) = 1 if 훾푖 = 1, and 휇2퐵(ℎ
′, 휎2푀 , 휏 = 퐼) = 0 if 훾푖 = 훾푙.
Proof of Proposition 1
We will show that if consumers believe 푝1 ∈ {푟표표푡푙표푤2,min[푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ2, 2+훿2 ]} comes from
a high type, then there will be separating equilibria. We will give the explanation of 푟표표푡푙표푤2
and 푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ2 below.
We have already calculated the threshold agent 휃1 and profit 푉훾(푝1, 휇1퐵) for a given 휇1퐵
and 푝1 in the text in equations 2 and 3. They were;
휃1(푝1, 휇1퐵) =
2푝1
(2 + 훿)[휇1퐵 + (1− 휇1퐵)훾푙] (2)
푉훾푖(푝1, 휇1퐵) = 푝1(1− 휃1(푝1, 휇1퐵)) + 훿훾푖(
휃1(푝1, 휇1퐵)
2
)2 (3)
First, we will find the price range that the low type monopolist will not deviate. In a
separating equilibrium, the low type monopolist will maximize its profits as follows:
max푝1 푉훾푙(푝1, 0) = 푝1(1− 휃1(푝1, 0)) + 훿훾푙( 휃1(푝1,0)2 )2.
Solving this maximization problem yields 푝1 =
(2+훿)2훾푙
2(4+훿)
which in turn yields 휃1 =
2+훿
4+훿
.
Thus, the profit of low quality type in a separating equilibrium is given by:
휋푆푒푝퐿표푤 = 푉훾푙(푝1 =
(2 + 훿)2훾푙
2(4 + 훿)
, 휇1퐵 = 0) =
훾푙(2 + 훿)
2
4(4 + 훿)
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We now calculate the low type producer’s deviation profits if it deviates to some price
range so that consumers believe he is a high type. This deviation profit is:
휋푆푒푝퐿표푤퐷푒푣 = 푉훾푙(푝1, 휇1퐵 = 1) = 푝1(1−
2푝1
(2 + 훿)
) +
훿훾푙푝
2
1
(2 + 훿)2
To compare the profits of the separating equilibrium with the profits of the deviation, we
subtract the deviation profits from the separating equilibrium profits and set the resulting
function equal to 0. i.e. 휋푆푒푝퐿표푤 − 휋푆푒푝퐿표푤퐷푒푣 = 훾푙(2+훿)24(4+훿) − [푝(1− 2푝(2+훿)) + 훿훾푙푝
2
(2+훿)2
] = 0 = 푓(푝).
Since 푓 and 휋푆푒푝퐿표푤퐷푒푣 is a polynomial of degree two, we can find at most two roots,
and later we will show that there are exactly two roots. These roots will be positive since
휋푆푒푝퐿표푤퐷푒푣(푝 = 0) = 0, 휋푆푒푝퐿표푤퐷푒푣 is increasing at 0, concave (because 푓
′′ = 휋′′푆푒푝퐿표푤퐷푒푣 =
훿(−4+훾푙)−4
(2+훿)2
< 0), and 휋푆푒푝퐿표푤 > 0 for any positive 훾푙 (see figure 3). For any price p lower than
the smallest root and any price p greater than the biggest root, the profit from deviating is
less than the profit from the separating equilibrium. We calculate the roots of this function;
푟표표푡푙표푤1 is the smallest root, and 푟표표푡푙표푤2 is the greatest root. In the equations below, the
term inside the square roots are positive; hence, there are exactly two roots.
푟표표푡푙표푤1 =
[(2 + 훿)2[4 + 훿 −√(4 + 훿)(1− 훾푙)[훿(1− 훾푙) + 4) ]
2(4 + 훿)(훿(2− 훾푙) + 4) (7)
푟표표푡푙표푤2 =
[(2 + 훿)2[4 + 훿 +
√
(4 + 훿)(1− 훾푙)[훿(1− 훾푙) + 4) ]
2(4 + 훿)(훿(2− 훾푙) + 4) (8)
In what follows, we will calculate the two roots in which the high type monopolist will
not deviate if the price is within these two roots.
Let us calculate the high type’s profit in a separating equilibrium given 푝1.
휋푆푒푝퐻푖푔ℎ = 푉훾=1(푝1, 휇1퐵 = 1) = 푝1(1− 2푝1
(2 + 훿)
) +
훿푝21
(2 + 훿)2
The profits of the high firm posing as a low firm as a function of 푝1 is given by 푉 (푝1, 휇1퐵 =
0, 훾 = 1) = 푝1(1 − 2푝1훾푙(2+훿)) + 훿 푝
2
1
훾2푙 (2+훿)
2 . If we maximize this function with respect to 푝1, we
find price that will maximize the deviation profit, 푝1 =
훾2푙 (2+훿)
2
2(4훾푙+2훿훾푙−훿) . Since, we assume
that 훾푙 >
훿
4+훿
, this will guarantee that 푝1 is positive plus the roots below (roothigh1 and
roothigh2) exist.
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Figure 3: A separation equilibrium example when high type separates itself by choosing
푝1 ∈ {1.253, 1.295}. The lines are equilibrium and deviation payoffs for high and low types.
While it is not shown on the graph, waiting to sell in the second period is not profitable
when 0.34 < 푝1 < 1.3.
By inserting the expression for 푝1 into the profit function, we get the maximum profit
from deviating (and our assumption 훾푙 >
훿
4+훿
implies it is always positive):
휋푆푒푝퐻푖푔ℎ퐷푒푣 =
훾2푙 (2 + 훿)
2
4(4훾푙 + 2훿훾푙 − 훿) (9)
We have to find the range in which a deviation will not occur. By equating the 휋푆푒푝퐻푖푔ℎ퐷푒푣
and 휋푆푒푝퐻푖푔ℎ, we find two roots. The smallest root is roothigh1 and the greatest root is
roothigh2:
푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ1 =
(2+훿)2[(2훾푙(2+훿)−훿−
√
(1−훾푙)(2훾푙(2+훿)−훿)(훾푙(4+훿)−훿))
2(4+훿)[2훾푙(2+훿)−훿]
푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ2 =
(2+훿)2[(2훾푙(2+훿)−훿+
√
(1−훾푙)(2훾푙(2+훿)−훿)(훾푙(4+훿)−훿))
2(4+훿)[2훾푙(2+훿)−훿]
When 푝1 ∈ [푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ1, 푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ2], the high type does not deviate from the separating
equilibrium (see figure 3). We should also make sure that announcing/waiting in the first
period and selling only in the second period is not profitable for the high type.16 The waiting
profit of high type is calculated as 휋퐻푖푔ℎ푊푎푖푡 =
훿
4
. The 휋푆푒푝퐻푖푔ℎ − 휋퐻푖푔ℎ푊푎푖푡 = 0 function has
two roots:
훿(2+훿)
(4+훿)
and 2+훿
2
16The low type will never find waiting profitable.
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When 푝1 is ∈ [ 훿(2+훿)(4+훿) , 2+훿2 ], waiting will not be profitable.
Therefore, when we have max{ 훿(2+훿)
(4+훿)
, 푟표표푡푙표푤2} < 푝1 < min{푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ2, 2+훿2 },17 there is a
separating equilibrium since neither low type nor the high type deviates.18. We can restrict
this range further since it is easy to see that 훿(2+훿)
(4+훿)
< 푟표표푡푙표푤2.19
In figure 3, we show such a separating equilibrium. When consumers believe that any
푝 ∈ {1.253, 1.295} is chosen by the high-type monopolist, all conditions are satisfied, and
there is a separating equilibrium.
Now, we will show that there is only one price that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion. First,
we assume that 푝1 = 푟표표푡푙표푤2 is greater than the high type’s profit maximizing price in a
perfect information case. In figure 3, we have such a case. The equilibrium that satisfies
the Intuitive Criterion is the minimum price in the given range of separating equilibria; that
is, 푝1 = 푟표표푡푙표푤2. For any other equilibrium 푝1, the high type monopolist will switch to a
slightly lower 푝 in the range (since this will be profit increasing for the high-type by the fact
that the payoff function is concave, and as we approach to the profit maximizing price from
right, profits will be increasing) but this is equilibrium dominated for the low type monopolist
(otherwise this would not be part of separating equilibrium) and hence, consumers should
believe that this deviation comes from a high-type monopolist. But then this violates the
Intuitive Criterion. When 푝1 is the minimum price in the range, any deviation to a higher
price is equilibrium dominated for high type, and any deviation to the right will be better
for both low and high types (this would break the separating equilibrium); hence, Intuitive
Criterion is satisfied.20
Proof of Proposition 2: We will show this for two different cases; 1) 훾푙 <
훿
2+훿
and 2)
훾푙 >
훿
2+훿
.
17When 훾푙 <
훿
2+훿 ,
2+훿
2 is less than roothigh2.
18While we could not prove that 푟표표푡푙표푤1 < 푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ1, all our numeric examples indicated this result.
Hence, we do not try to look for other separating equilibria in the range 푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ1 < 푝1 < 푟표표푡푙표푤1.
19To show that we assume that the square root term in rootlow2 is zero (otherwise, rootlow2 will be even
a greater number). Then, after some algebraic manipulation, we get 2훿2(2 − 훿) + 8훿) < 8 + 2훿 + 4훿 + 훿2.
This is always true since 훿 and 훾푙 are positive and less than 1.
20If we ever have a separating equilibrium in which 푝1 = 푟표표푡푙표푤2 is smaller than the high type’s profit
maximizing price in a perfect information case, then the profit maximizing price will be the only price that
satisfies the Intuitive Criterion.
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Figure 4: Pooling equilibrium when .38 < 푝1 < .82, 훿 = .9, 훾푙 = .2, 훼 = .5
1) Assume 훾푙 <
훿
2+훿
. We will show such equilibria exist if the pooling price 푝1 consumers
believe is in the range of:
훿(2 + 훿)[훾푙 + 훼(1− 훾푙)]
4[(2 + 훿)(훼(1− 훾푙) + 훾푙)]− 2훿 < 푝1 <
(2 + 훿)[훾푙 + 훼(1− 훾푙)]
2
and
[훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙](훿+2)2{(4+훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)−
√
훼(1−훾푙)(훿+4)[4훾푙+훼(1−훾푙)(4+훿)]}
2(4+훿)[2(2+훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)−훿훾푙] < 푝1 <
[훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙](훿+2)2{(4+훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)+
√
훼(1−훾푙)(훿+4)[4훾푙+훼(1−훾푙)(4+훿)]}
2(4+훿)[2(2+훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)−훿훾푙]
Note that this range is not empty since figure 4 gives a pooling equilibrium example.
To prove this, first, let us calculate the no-deviation range for the high-type monopolist.
In a pooling equilibrium, 휇1퐵 = 훼; hence,
Π퐻푖푔ℎ푃표표푙 = 푉훾=1(푝1, 훼) = 푝1(1− 2푝1(2+훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)) + 훿4(
2푝1
(2+훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙))
2
The high type monopolist can deviate in two different ways. One way is posing as low
type in the first period. The other way is announcing/waiting in the first period and selling
in the second period. If it poses as a low type, its profit is 휋퐻푖푔ℎ푃표표푙퐷푒푣 =
훾2푙 (2+훿)
2
4(4훾푙+2훾푙훿−훿) . Its
waiting equilibrium profit is 훿
4
.21 A quick calculation shows that when our assumption in the
21Note that the out of equilibrium path is not important for this equilibrium since the monopolist will not
sell in the first period by announcing to wait, and then consumers will learn the type in the second period.
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proposition, 훾푙 <
훿
2+훿
, holds, then waiting equilibrium is higher than posing as a low type
equilibrium. Therefore, the high-type will not deviate if its profit in the pooling equilibrium
is greater than or equal to the profit of waiting equilibrium which is 훿
4
. Just as the previous
case, we define a function that shows the difference of equilibrium profit and deviation profit,
and find its roots.
푔(푝1) = 푝1(1− 2푝1−2훼−훼훿−2훾푙−훾푙훿+2훾푙훼+훾푙훼훿 ) + 훿4(
−2푝1
−2훼−훼훿−2훾푙−훾푙훿+2훾푙훼+훾푙훼훿 )
2 − 훿
4
The roots are:
푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ푡푦푝푒2 = 훼 +
1
2
훼훿 + 훾푙 +
1
2
훾푙훿 − 훾푙훼− 12훾푙훼훿 = (2+훿)[훾푙+훼(1−훾푙)]2
푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ푡푦푝푒1 =
(1/2)훿(−2훼−훼훿−2훾푙−훾푙훿+2훾푙훼+훾푙훼훿)
(2훾푙훼훿−2훼훿+4훾푙훼−4훼−2훾푙훿+훿−4훾푙) =
훿(2+훿)[훾푙+훼(1−훾푙)]
2[2(2+훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)−훿]
If 푝1 is between the roots above and 훾푙 <
훿
2+훿
, then we get the no-deviation range for the
high-type monopolist. Note that 푝1 < 푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ푡푦푝푒2 ensures that 휃1 is less than 1 (see equation
2). In other words, it guarantees that waiting equilibrium payoff is not greater than pooling
equilibrium payoff.
For the low type, profit in a pooling equilibrium22 is:
Π퐿표푤푃표표푙 = 푉훾푙(푝1, 훼) = 푝1(1− 2푝1(2+훿)[훼+(1−훼)훾푙]) +
훿훾푙
4
( 2푝1
(2+훿)[훼+(1−훼)훾푙])
2
Its deviation profit is:
Π퐿표푤푃표표푙퐷푒푣 =
훾푙(훿+2)
2
4(4+훿)
The roots of the difference function, Π퐿표푤푃표표푙 − Π퐿표푤푃표표푙퐷푒푣, is:
Π퐿표푤푃표표푙 − Π퐿표푤푃표표푙퐷푒푣 = 푝1(1− 2푝1(2+훿)[훼+(1−훼)훾푙]) +
훿훾푙
4
( 2푝1
(2+훿)[훼+(1−훼)훾푙])
2 − 훾푙(훿+2)2
4(4+훿)
⇔ 푝24(4 + 훿){2(2 + 훿)[훼 + (1− 훼)훾푙]− 훿훾푙} − 푝4(4 + 훿)(2 + 훿)2[훼 + (1− 훼)훾푙]2 + 훾푙(2 +
훿)4[훼 + (1− 훼)훾푙]2 = 0
푟표표푡푙표푤푡푦푝푒2 =
[훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙](훿+2)2{(4+훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)+
√
훼(1−훾푙)(훿+4)[4훾푙+훼(1−훾푙)(4+훿)]}
2(4+훿)[2(2+훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)−훿훾푙]
푟표표푡푙표푤푡푦푝푒1 =
[훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙](훿+2)2{(4+훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)−
√
훼(1−훾푙)(훿+4)[4훾푙+훼(1−훾푙)(4+훿)]}
2(4+훿)[2(2+훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)−훿훾푙]
This gives the no-deviation range for the low-type monopolist. As we combine the no-
deviation conditions for high and low type, we get pooling equilibria (see figure 4 for an
example).
Case 2) Assume 훾푙 >
훿
2+훿
. The only thing that will change is that if the high type
deviates, it will deviate to pose as a low type rather than to deviate to wait.
22If the high type does not find waiting profitable, then the low type definitely does not find it profitable.
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Π퐻푖푔ℎ푃표표푙 − 휋퐻푖푔ℎ푃표표푙퐷푒푣 = 푝1(1− 2푝1(2+훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)) + 훿4(
2푝1
(2+훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙))
2 − 훾2푙 (2+훿)2
4(4훾푙+2훾푙훿−훿) = 0
⇔ 푝14(4훾푙 +2훾푙훿− 훿)(2+ 훿)2(훼+ 훾푙−훼훾푙)2− 2푝214(4훾푙 +2훾푙훿− 훿)(2 + 훿)(훼+ 훾푙−훼훾푙) +
4훿푝21(4훾푙 + 2훾푙훿 − 훿)− 훾2푙 (2 + 훿)4(훼+ 훾푙 − 훼훾푙)2 = 0
⇔푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ푡푦푝푒2,1= (2+훿)2(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙){(4훾푙+2훾푙훿−훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)−
√
훼(1−훾푙)(4훾푙+2훾푙훿−훿)[(4훾푙+2훾푙훿−훿)(훼+훾푙−훼훾푙)−훿훾푙]}
2(4훾푙+2훾푙훿−훿)[2(2+훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)−훿]
⇔푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ푡푦푝푒2,2= (2+훿)
2[훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙]{(4훾푙+2훾푙훿−훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)+
√
훼(1−훾푙)[2훾푙(2+훿)−훿][2(1−훼)(2+훿)훾2푙 +[(3훼−2)훿+4훼]훾푙−훿훼}
2(4훾푙+2훾푙훿−훿)[2(2+훿)(훼(1−훾푙)+훾푙)−훿]
For the low type, no-deviation range is still the same as Case 1. Hence, when price is
between
푀푎푥{푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ푡푦푝푒2,1, 푟표표푡푙표푤푡푦푝푒1} < 푝1 < 푀푖푛{푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ푡푦푝푒2,2, 푟표표푡푙표푤푡푦푝푒2}
and 훾푙 >
훿
2+훿
, we have a pooling equilibrium.
Figure 5: Indifference Curves at the Pooling equilibrium when 푝1 = .635, 훿 = .8, 훾푙 = .5,
훼 = .5 The high type’s (low type’s) is the one shifted further right (left). Preferable pairs of
(푝1, 휇1퐵) lies inside for both types. High type may deviate to 푝1 = 1.15 which is equilibrium
dominated for low type (even when 휇1퐵 = 1); hence, Intuitive Criterion does not hold.
When 훾푙 > 0, these pooling equilibria do not satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. For any
pooling equilibrium (푝1, 휇1퐵), we calculate the indifference curve, 푉훾(푝1, 휇1퐵), (where 훾 ∈
{1, 훾푙}) for both types. We will show that these indifference curves satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees
condition (i.e., single crossing property). But then, we can show that high type monopolist
will deviate to a (very high) price that the low type will not deviate even if consumers’ belief
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change to 휇1퐵 = 1 after observing such a deviation (See Figure 5). Therefore, the pooling
equilibria do not satisfy the intuitive criterion.
First, we calculate the following partial derivatives:
푑푉
푑푝1
(훾, 휇1퐵, 푝1) = 1− 4푝1
((2 + 훿)(휇1퐵 + (1− 휇1퐵)훾푙)) +
2훿훾푝1
((2 + 훿)2(휇1퐵 + (1− 휇1퐵)훾푙)2)
푑푉
푑휇1퐵
=
2푝21(1− 훾푙)
((2 + 훿)(휇1퐵 + (1− 휇1퐵)훾푙)2) −
2훿훾푝21(1− 훾푙)
((2 + 훿)2(휇1퐵 + (1− 휇1퐵)훾푙)3)
By using the equations above, we calculate the following derivative (and we can take the
derivative since 훾푙 > 0:
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−푑( 푑푉/푑푝1
푑푉/푑휇1퐵
)
푑훾
= −((2 + 훿)(−훿휇1퐵 − 훿훾푙 + 훿훾푙휇1퐵 − 2휇1퐵 + 2훾푙휇1퐵 + 2푝1 − 2훾푙)(−휇1퐵 − 훾푙 + 훾푙휇1퐵)
2훿
2(푝21(−2휇1퐵 − 2훾푙 + 2훾푙휇1퐵 − 훿휇1퐵 − 훿훾푙 + 훿훾푙휇1퐵 + 훿훾)2(−1 + 훾푙))
But then−푑( 푑푉/푑푝1
푑푉/푑휇1퐵
)/(푑훾) is always negative since the denominator is negative (−1+훾푙 <
0) and the numerator is also positive since
(−훿휇1퐵 − 훿훾푙 + 훿훾푙휇1퐵 − 2휇1퐵 + 2훾푙휇1퐵 + 2푝1 − 2훾푙)⇔ 푝1 < (2 + 훿)(훾푙 + 훼(1− 훾푙)
2
The right hand side of the equation above should hold in any pooling equilibrium; other-
wise, 휃1 > 1 holds and that means waiting equilibrium payoff will be greater than pooling
equilibrium payoff for the high type.
This is the Spence-Mirrlees condition so the single crossing holds. In addition, this shows
that the derivative of low type’s indifference curve (at the crossing point) is greater than the
high type’s; hence, low type’s indifference curve touches 휇1퐵 = 1 at a lower price (say 푝푙)
than the high type’s. If the high type deviates to a price slightly greater than this 푝푙, then
the low type would not follow high type even under the belief 휇1퐵 = 1. Hence, intuitive
criterion will be violated.
23Note that by dividing those derivatives, we get −푑휇1퐵푑푝1 which is the slope of the indifference curves.
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However, when 훾푙 = 0, given the belief that 휇1퐵 = 훼, now the low type will always mimic
the high type in the first period, and no 푝1 can be equilibrium dominated for the low type
since it will be making zero profits if consumers knew/learned that it is a low type. Hence,
the pooling equilibrium satisfies the Intuitive Criterion for 훾푙 = 0 case.
This concludes our proof.
Proof of Proposition 3:
For a given equilibrium we compare the equilibrium prices we computed for any pooling
equilibrium. For part a), we have
푝1 < 푝2 =
푝1
(2 + 훿)(훼 + 훾푙 + 훼훾푙)
⇐⇒ 훿 < 1− 2(훼+ 훾푙 − 훼훾푙)
(훼 + 훾푙 − 훼훾푙)
Note that 푝2 =
휃1
2
(from the second period maximization problem of the high type
monopolist).
Proof of part b follows from part a.
Proof of Proposition 6: We will show that such an equilibrium exists when 훾푙 <
훿
2+훿
and consumers believe that any firm selling in the first period is a low type.24
The waiting profit of the high-type firm is given by 휋푤푎푖푡 =
훿
4
, since 휃1 = 1.
The profits of the high firm posing as a low firm is the same as in equation 9, which is
휋퐻푖푔ℎ퐷푒푣 =
(2 + 훿)2훾2푙
4(4훾푙 + 2훿훾푙 − 훿)
For the firm to wait, and not deviate and pose as a low type, the profits of waiting must
be greater than or equal to the profits of deviating as a low type. The root of the function
휋푤푎푖푡 − 휋퐻푖푔ℎ퐷푒푣 is 훾푙 = 훿/(2 + 훿). When 훾푙 < 훿2+훿 , the waiting profit will be higher, and
hence, the high type waits for the second period to sell.
If 훾푙 = 0 holds, then no 푝1 can be equilibrium dominated for the low type since it is
already making zero profits. Hence, this satisfies the Intuitive Criterion. If 훾푙 is positive,
24There may be other waiting equilibrium for different parameter ranges with different beliefs so we do
not claim that this is the only waiting equilibrium. This equilibrium, however, is sufficient to show “waiting
equilibrium” exists.
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then assume that high type deviates to some 푝1 ∈ (푟표표푡푙표푤2,푚푖푛{푟표표푡ℎ푖푔ℎ2, 2+훿2 }). we have
already showed in the separating equilibrium proof that these price ranges are equilibrium
dominated for low type even under the belief 휇1퐵 = 1 but is profitable for the high type
compared to waiting. Therefore, such equilibria cannot satisfy intuitive criterion.
7 Appendix B
7.1 Separating Equilibrium Case
Here, we will calculate the welfare under the separating equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive
criterion. This is when25
푝1 = 푟표표푡푙표푤2 =
[(2 + 훿)2[4 + 훿 +
√
(4 + 훿)(1− 훾푙)[훿(1− 훾푙) + 4) ]
2(4 + 훿)(훿(2− 훾푙) + 4)
Let us first calculate the welfare under the high type monopolist, then we will turn to
the low type monopolist. Finally, we will add these welfare calculations to solve for the total
ex-ante expected welfare.
The profit of high type monopolist in a separating equilibrium is 푉훾=1(푝1 = 푟표표푡푙표푤2, 휇1퐵 =
1). To calculate social welfare, we need 휃1, and it can be calculated from equation 2.
휃1(푝1 = 푟표표푡푙표푤2, 휇1퐵 = 1) =
−(2 + 훿)(4 + 훿 +√(4 + 훿)(−1 + 훾푙)(−훿 + 훿훾푙 − 4))
((4 + 훿)(−2훿 + 훿훾푙 − 4))
In the equilibrium, we have 휃2 = 푝2 =
휃1
2
. Consumer surplus can be calculated by inserting
휃1, 휃2, 푝1 and 푝2 to the following equation:
퐶푆ℎ =
∫ 1
휃1
(휃 − 푝1)푑휃 + 훿
∫ 휃1
휃2
(휃 − 푝2)푑휃
After taking the integral and simplifying, and adding the profit, we calculate the welfare
under the high type monopolist in a separating equilibrium.26 Since, the expression is cum-
bersome, we provide its three dimensional graph in figure 6. While drawing the graph, we
assumed 훼 = 1.
25In the proofs, we demonstrate that 푝1 = 푟표표푡푙표푤2 satisfies the intuitive criterion.
26MAPLE is used in making these calculations and drawing the graphs. It is available from the authors.
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Figure 6: Welfare under a high-type monopolist (on the left) and its (always positive) deriva-
tive w. r. t. 훿 (on the right)
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Figure 7: Welfare (on the left) and Derivative of Welfare w. r. t. 훿 (on the right)
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As expected, welfare increases with 훾푙 since this will decrease signalling cost for the high-
type. This is clear from the first graph in figure 6. It also increases with 훿. As delta increases,
price increases and hence less consumers buy the good. This decreases consumer surplus.
However, profit always increases as delta increases. The net effect is positive.
Now, we will calculate the welfare under a low type monopolist in a separating equilib-
rium. The low type monopolist actually produces the amounts it would produce in a perfect
information model in a separating equilibrium.
The profit is 푉푙(푝1 =
(2+훿)2훾푙
2(4+훿)
, 휇1퐵 = 0) =
훾푙(2+훿)
2
4(4+훿)
. To calculate the consumer surplus, we
need 휃1 =
2+훿
4+훿
, 휃2 =
2+훿
2(4+훿)
, 푝2 = 훾푙
2+훿
2(4+훿)
.
퐶푆푙 =
∫ 1
휃1=
2+훿
4+훿
(휃 − (2 + 훿)
2훾푙
2(4 + 훿)
)푑휃 + 훿
∫ 2+훿
(4+훿)
2+훿
2(4+훿)
(휃 − 훾푙 2 + 훿
2(4 + 훿)
)푑휃
Taking the integral, we have,
퐶푆푙 =
1
8(4 + 훿)2
[3훿3 + 12훿2 + 28훿 + 48− 2훿3훾푙 − 16훿2훾푙 − 40훿훾푙 − 32훾푙]
then,by adding the profit, we have the welfare when we have a low type:
푊푙 =
3훿3 + 12훿2 + 28훿 + 48− 2훿3훾푙 − 16훿2훾푙 − 40훿훾푙 − 32훾푙
8(4 + 훿)2
+
훾푙(2 + 훿)
2
4(4 + 훿)
Total expected welfare is 훼푊ℎ + (1− 훼푊푙). However, calculating total expected welfare
analytically is cumbersome so we give its three dimensional graph in figure 7. We assume
훼 = 1
2
while drawing the graph. The graph shows that welfare increases as 훾푙 increases; as
훾푙 increases, the cost of signalling for high-type decreases; hence, the welfare increases. The
derivative of welfare with respect to delta is positive.
Let us now calculate the efficiency loss for the separating equilibrium. The low type
produces the same output in both perfect information and separating equilibrium. The
loss comes from the high type’s signalling effort. We have already calculated welfare when
there is a high type monopolist under perfect information and under separating equilibrium.
By subtracting these welfare and multiplying with 훼, we calculate the efficiency loss. We
report its three dimensional graph in figure 8 (while drawing the graph, we used 훼 = 1. As
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Figure 8: Efficiency Loss and its derivative w. r. t. 훿
the probability of having a high-type monopolist increases, efficiency loss decreases.) and
show that efficiency loss decreases as delta increases. Welfare under separating equilibrium
increases faster as delta increases. The cost of signalling must be decreasing as agents become
more patient.
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